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T
he issue of limiting carbon emissions has recently com-
manded international attention. Starting with the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol, world markets have begun to coalesce around the
notion that carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions should be con-
trolled or capped. There are three generally accepted methods
for limiting the emission of  CO2: 1) a carbon tax that charges
producers a fee for emissions that exceed a prespecified amount;
2) an auction, in which organizations bid on credits that are then
used to offset the amount of actual  CO2 emitted; and 3) a “cap
and trade” system. 
The cap and trade system proposed at Kyoto envisioned that
a limit (i.e., cap) would be imposed by the government on the
amount of CO2 emissions allowed in a given period. Organizations
with emissions that do not exceed the limit are free to trade the
difference between the cap and their expected amount of emis-
sions as “CO2 credits.”  Likewise, organizations that anticipate
exceeding the limit may purchase these credits in order to
exceed the cap amount. The economics of purchasing the cred-
its make sense when their cost is less than the cost required to
reduce emissions below the cap. 
Trading in CO2 Credits: 
Tax Issues to Consider
T A X A T I O N
c o r p o r a t e  t a x a t i o n
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In essence, an auction and cap and trade
system are similar in that entities can pur-
chase credits outright, with a government
usually controlling the number of credits
auctioned. They are dissimilar in that the
auction is not a secondary market where
firms can trade previously purchased cred-
its. Unfortunately, the cap and trade sys-
tem is not optimal in the long term from
a pollution control perspective, in the sense
that each player in the economy is not
forced to lower  emissions. It is, however,
practical for many businesses and offers a
more palatable transition toward eventual
lower emissions overall. Because the
most prevalent method used today is the
cap and trade system, this article will focus
on that methodology.
Most of the cap and trade activity has
occurred in Europe, but carbon trading is
emerging as a very real possibility in the
United States, particularly with global warm-
ing moving up in the political agenda. While
action at the federal level had been stagnant
under the Bush administration, individual
states started to take action to reduce emis-
sions (e.g., California’s  promoting the use
of carbon credits for reducing emissions).
While there is no regulatory guidance in the
evolving CO2 area, the U.S. Treasury has
issued regulations dealing with the similar
cap and trade system for sulfur dioxide
(SO2) emissions.
What follows is a review of the feder-
al tax precedent established for SO2 cred-
its. The authors believe these rules may
eventually be applied to CO2 credits.
Familiarity with current practice will be
helpful until the IRS specifically clarifies
if rules governing SO2 credits will be
applied to CO2 credits.
Sulfur Dioxide Credits 
While the focus on carbon emissions is
relatively new, the issue of controlling
emissions  is not. Title IV of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 charged the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
with regulation of SO2 emissions. A major
provision specified that the EPA would
control compliance through the regular
issuance of credits which could be used
to offset actual emissions. The credits,
issued at no cost to the recipient (usually
a utility), limited the amount of allowable
emissions by setting a de facto ceiling (i.e.,
the sum of the credits). The EPA moni-
tored actual emissions, providing regula-
tory enforcement. In response to the
issuance of SO2 credits, the IRS issued
Revenue Procedure 92-91, which provides
guidance on how the credits should be
treated from a tax standpoint.
Because the practice of carbon trading
loosely follows the parameters established
under the Clean Air Act, it is expected
that the tax issues surrounding the pur-
chase, sale, and exchange of CO2 credits
will fit within the framework adopted for
the treatment of SO2 credits found in
Revenue Procedure 92-91. The IRS has
not issued similar guidance for CO2 cred-
its, but given the economic similarity
between SO2 and CO2 credit trading sys-
tems, it is likely the IRS would recom-
mend similar tax treatment. 
Regulation Procedure 92-91 provides the
following:
■ Credits issued by the EPA to utilities
have a zero basis rather than a fair market
value basis because they were allocated,
not purchased. If costs are incurred to
acquire or hold the credit, then these costs
must be capitalized. 
■ Credits purchased, rather than grant-
ed, are to be recorded at cost (including
transaction costs), and this cost should be
capitalized.
■ Credits are generally treated as capital
assets. If the taxpayer holds this type of
credit as inventory, then the gain upon sale
is ordinary.
■ Credits are not depreciable because
they do not have a set useful life. The
taxpayer claims a deduction in the year that
offset SO2 is emitted.
■ Credits can be sold or exchanged.
■ If credits are sold, the gain or loss is
capital in nature unless the seller is engaged
in the sale of these credits as a regular busi-
ness, in which case the gain or loss is ordi-
nary in nature.
■ The exchange of credits qualifies as
a like-kind exchange under IRC section
1031, resulting in no gain recognition at
the time of the exchange. In this case,
basis is carried over in accordance with
section 1031.
■ The withholding and sale of credits
by the EPA is treated as an involuntary
conversion. The purchase of replacement
credits is treated as similar-use property for
IRC section 1033 purposes.
■ In the case of persons acting as
investors or traders of SO2 credits, the same
rules apply where applicable.
Differences Between CO2
and SO2 Credits
While similarities exist between SO2 and
CO2 credits, there are also differences in
the business arena and in the underlying
rights that could create distinct tax rules
in trading credits. The key differences are
as follows: 
■ CO2 credits are purchased. They are
not allocated by the EPA and, therefore,
should always have a starting basis equal
to what was paid for them, which cannot
be zero.
■ There is generally an expiration date
for carbon credits, so amortization must be
considered.
■ Active markets exist for the trading of car-
bon credits [e.g., Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), Chicago Climate
Exchange, and the European market for the
trading of carbon credits. See www.cdm.org
and www.chicagoclimateexchange.com for
more information]. The market value of car-
bon credits is volatile, making gains or loss-
es from the trading of such credits likely. 
■ No single regulatory body is currently
responsible for monitoring compliance in
the United States (i.e., setting carbon lim-
its and measuring actual emissions). While
the Chicago Climate Exchange offers what
is presumed to be an efficient market that
should detect and “punish” rogue firms
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SO2 and CO2 credits, there are also
differences in the business arena
and in the underlying rights 
that could create distinct tax 
rules in trading credits. 
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STATE TAX INITIATIVES
Many states have enacted or proposed legislation regulat-ing the emission of carbon dioxide. The majority of thislegislation sets limits on the amount of CO2 that can beemitted in a given amount of time (e.g., 40 tons per year).
Some limits are voluntary and some are mandated, but the general
goal is to lower CO2 emissions. The following are summaries of ini-
tiatives in states invoking cap and trade systems or imposing a car-
bon tax in their legislation. Also included are summaries of initiatives
derived by regional associations formed by a consortium of more
than one state, as well as other current issues affecting state regu-
lation of CO2 credits. 
New York
Enacted 2005. On December 20, 2005, New York State entered
into a regional agreement to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions from power plants. Under the agreement, New York joined
10 other northeast and mid-Atlantic states to propose the Region-
al Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The initiative, originally estab-
lished in 2003 (see below), seeks to voluntarily cap and reduce car-
bon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power plants in the region by 10%
by 2019. 
Enacted 2001. Executive Order 111, signed by Governor George
Pataki, referred to as the “Green and Clean” state buildings and
vehicles guidelines, mandates a reduction in greenhouse emis-
sions for all state-operated buildings and vehicles. The order con-
tains numerous directives designed to reduce energy use and the
carbon impact caused by the state government.
Enacted 2000. In May 2000, New York State enacted the Green
Building Tax Credit (GBTC) for owners and tenants of buildings that
meet energy, indoor air quality, materials, and water conservation
goals, among other criteria. The GBTC is prospective in nature in
that it provides a tax incentive for ongoing maintenance, as well
as an incentive for the initial cost of compliance. The GBTC allows
licensed architects and engineers to certify compliance.
Proposed. In order to execute New York’s commitment to the
RGGI, the Department of Environmental Conservation has proposed
statute 6 NYCRR Part 242 and Part 507. Part 242 establishes the CO2
Budget Trading Program designed to allocate CO2 emissions
allowances to an Energy Efficiency and Clean Energy Technology
Account, while Part 507 allows the trading of these allowances
through auctions overseen by the New York State Energy Research
and Development Authority (NYSERDA). Revenue from the sale of
these allowances will fund programs promoting energy efficiency,
renewable or non–carbon-emitting technologies, and innovative
carbon-emissions technologies with significant carbon-reduction
potential. 
California
Enacted 2006. The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32)
is the most comprehensive legislation addressing greenhouse gas
emissions in the United States to date. AB 32 mandates that carbon
emissions be tracked, sets predefined limits as to the amount of CO2
that can be legally emitted, reduces this limit beginning in 2010 and
thereafter, imposes penalties and fines if those limits are not met,
and specifically mentions a cap and trade system as an alternative
to fines and penalties. Additionally, AB 32 segments organizations into 
“projects” (i.e., similar types of organizations): forestry, building 
energy, landfills, manure management, and SFG. Emissions are a
function of which type of project is applicable to the organization,
meaning that one organization may find itself in more than one 
segment.
Colorado
Enacted 2007. Boulder, Colo., began taxing the use of carbon
energy (i.e., use of any nonrenewable energy source).
Proposed. Colorado is considering a tax on any consumption of
nonrenewable energy.
Illinois
Enacted 1997. Illinois passed the Volatile Organic Compound Act
which aims to reduce the emission of 100 sources of pollution with-
in an eight-county area. Participants trade credits for not only CO2,
but other organic polluters as well. Participation is voluntary.
Kansas
Enacted. Kansas has enacted an income tax credit for the pur-
chase of alternative fuel vehicles.
Oregon
Enacted. Oregon requires that new power plants (and other
large energy facilities) offset a significant portion of their carbon
dioxide emissions. There are two ways to comply: through the use
of offset projects (where renewable energy is produced to offset
carbon-based energy) or the “monetary path.” The latter option
involves payment of a fee (sometimes referred to as a “tax”) equal
to $0.85 per short ton of excess CO2 emission beyond the preset
limit. If the actual emissions exceed the projected emissions pro-
rated for a five-year period, the energy producer must offset the
excess emissions using the monetary path. If the energy produc-
er has not emitted CO2 equal to the prorated amount in previous
five-year periods, the state will credit it with the “unused” emis-
sions to determine the net amount of excess emissions the certifi-
cate holder may have to offset in future reporting periods. It is antic-
ipated that credits for emissions under the limit can be traded.
Washington
Proposed. Washington is considering investigating the feasibil-
ity of a cap and trade system for reducing gas emissions. Under
the proposed legislation, power plants are required to reduce their
CO2 emissions by 20% over a period of 30 years. The CO2 may be
mitigated by payment to an independent qualified organization; by
direct purchase of permanent carbon credits from real, perma-
nent, verifiable CO2 mitigation not otherwise required or used for
other CO2 mitigation projects; or by direct investment in CO2 miti-
gation projects. Direct investments are limited in amount to no
more than the cost of a lump-sum payment option.
West Virginia
Enacted. West Virginia has enacted lower property and business
and occupation (B&O) taxes for utility-owned wind turbines.
(Continues on page 46)  
trading worthless credits, it is not regula-
tory in nature. Any actions it takes may
be limited to civil, not criminal, remedies
for injured parties.
Questions About the Tax Treatment 
of Carbon Credits
In light of the differences noted above,
these distinctions are addressed by refer-
ence to the eight items provided in the
question-and-answer framework articulat-
ed in Revenue Procedure 92-91.
Question one: cost basis. Essentially no
differences should exist because Revenue
Procedure 92-91states that the costs relat-
ed to the acquisition and holding of the
credits are capitalized.
Question two: depreciation. No depre-
ciation is allowed under Revenue
Procedure 92-91. While this seems appro-
priate for credits that do not expire, it pre-
sents an issue for carbon credits that do
expire. Because the market for carbon cred-
its is relatively unregulated, carbon cred-
its (as well as other credits for gas emis-
sions) can take virtually any shape or form,
and their useful life varies significantly.
Short-term credits are considered tempo-
rary, as are longer-lived credits that are
leased or rented. Even renewable credits
are risky, in that the underlying event that
allows for renewal may cease to exist and
the credit may be deemed worthless. The
key issue for depreciating the basis of the
credit appears to hinge on the certainty of
the useful life of the credit.
Question three: the use of credits
against emissions. Revenue Procedure 92-
91 states that credits applied to emissions
should be charged to expense in the peri-
od in which they were used. This implies
that purchasers of carbon credits would
reduce taxable income by the amount of
the credit used during a period. The cost
is usually measured in tons, so firms would
calculate how many tons were used and
reduce their capital asset by the number
of credits used to offset that tonnage. It is
anticipated that CO2 credits in the United
States will be traded rather than used to
offset emissions. In such cases, the cost
will be recovered at the time of sale, as
described below.
Question four: sale of credits. While
Revenue Procedure 92-91 states that
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The key issue for depreciating 
the basis of the credit appears to 
hinge on the certainty of the 
useful life of the credit.
gains and losses arising from the sale of
SO2 credits are capital in nature as long
as the entity selling the credit is not
“holding a credit primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of trade or
business of dealing in allowances,” it is
unclear whether frequent trading by busi-
nesses whose primary purpose is not the
sale or exchange of credits (e.g., utilities)
still qualifies for capital gain treatment if
their sales activity rises to a recurring
nature. Specifically, concerns exist with
regard to the following issues:  
■ The point at which a company
becomes classified as a “trader.” The above
excerpt from Revenue Procedure 92-91
suggests that the intent of the firm (i.e.,
principal business) is the defining criteri-
on, but numerous examples from case
law indicate that frequency of trading is
also a criterion, leaving the determination
an open issue.
■ The depreciation treatment of carbon
credits. If carbon credits have a limited life
and are depreciated, then the gain or loss
on the subsequent sale of those credits
could be subject to recapture.
■ The sale of credits that were anticipat-
ed to be used by the taxpayer to offset
emissions (if such a system eventually
appears in the United States). The con-
cern is whether certain issues could cause
the credits to be ordinary rather than cap-
ital in nature. This occurred, for example,
in the case of Corn Products Refining Co.
v. Comm’r, [350 US 46 (1955)]. The
Supreme Court found that selling futures
contracts related to purchasing raw mate-
rials caused ordinary income instead of
capital gain. The company bought the
futures to ensure adequate supply. If the
contracts were not needed, they were then
sold. The Court focused on the relationship
of the futures to the ordinary operations
of the business.
Question five: tax treatment of
exchanges. Because SO2 credits are uni-
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REGIONAL INITIATIVES
Northeastern United States
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont are
members of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).
Observers in the process of joining include Washington, D.C.; Penn-
sylvania; the eastern Canadian provinces; and New Brunswick.
Enacted 2003. A consortium of 10 northeastern states whose goal
is to lower the amount of CO2 emissions in their area formed the
RGGI. The initiative begins capping emissions across the region on
January 1, 2009, based on current levels, and calls for the lower-
ing of the cap beginning in 2014 for the next four years. Unlike other
initiatives, the RGGI mandates a cap and trade system. Under this
system, each state is given “allowances” for its emissions, similar
to the system for SO2 credits. Each state has discretion for dis-
tributing these allowances. It can allocate them for free, sell them
by auction, or use a combination of the two. The exception is that
the RGGI stipulates that at least 25% of allowances be allocated
“for a consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose.” 
Western Regional Climate Action Initiative
Enacted 2007. This initiative is a collaboration between several U.S.
states and Canadian provinces. It calls for a cap on emission levels
and encourages a cap and trade system for voluntary compliance.
Additional Associations
Powering the Plains (PTP), Western Governors’ Association
(WGA), and the New England Governors’ Conference, Inc. (NEG)
have initiatives similar to those noted above.
Other Trends
While not unique to any one state, the use of “green tags” is
gaining popularity. Green tags are certificates awarded by state
and local governments to utilities for every 1,000 kilowatt-hours
of noncarbon energy production; benefits include revenue derived
from the sale of energy to the grid, as well as additional revenue
earned through auctioning the certificates.
Even if no legislation currently exists, most states will be
affected by efforts to limit carbon dioxide emissions, either
directly at the state or federal level, or indirectly in the form of
regional initiatives. One common theme that appears in recent-
ly enacted legislative initiatives is that CO2 limits will be reduced
over time, implying that compliance is transient and subject to
change at any given point. As a result, the cost of reducing car-
bon emissions, in whatever form, is only likely to increase.
(Continued from page 44)
Carbon credits come in many different types, with a multitude of terms,
conditions, and expiration dates. It is therefore uncertain whether 
the provision in Revenue Procedure 92-91 for like-kind 
treatment would extend to CO2 credits. 
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form in nature, exchanges of one credit for
another do not trigger a taxable gain or
loss; instead, they are treated as like-kind
exchanges under IRC section 1031. Carbon
credits, however, come in many different
types, with a multitude of terms, condi-
tions, and expiration dates. It is therefore
uncertain whether the provision in Revenue
Procedure 92-91 that SO2 credits are eli-
gible for like-kind treatment would
extend to CO2 credits. While one might
initially assume that SO2 and CO2 credits
should receive identical treatment, the mar-
ket for CO2 credits makes them appear
much more like a security-type instrument.
Because the like-kind provisions of IRC
section 1031 do not apply to stock sales,
it is uncertain whether the IRS would
extend the like-kind provisions to CO2
credits in the same manner as for SO2 cred-
its. If U.S. taxpayers were required to use
CO2 credits to offset their emissions, then
like-kind conversion rules should be appli-
cable in those scenarios as they are cur-
rently for SO2 credits. 
Question six: involuntary conversions.
Revenue Procedure 92-91 states that the
involuntary conversion of SO2 credits
allows for the purchase of replacement
credits which may be eligible for non-
recognition treatment under IRC section
1033. Because this issue was intended as
a remedy for any credit withholding by the
EPA, it is unclear whether involuntary con-
versions in general would apply. While the
involuntary conversion rules are stricter
in terms of replacement property require-
ments, this case of CO2 credits is one in
which involuntary conversion treatment
may be clearer than like-kind treatment. In
the case of a trader, the involuntary provi-
sion rules will not apply, as noted in
Revenue Procedure 92-91, for traders of
SO2 credits. If, in the future, U.S. taxpay-
ers are required to use CO2 credits to off-
set their emissions, then involuntary con-
version rules should be applicable. 
Question seven: penalties paid. The EPA
can impose fines for noncompliance with
the Clean Air Act. In the case of SO2 cred-
its, the monetary penalty is punitive and
therefore not deductible. The reduction of
future emissions allowances imposed on the
taxpayer, however, is not considered such
a penalty. Currently, these issues do not exist
in the United States for CO2 credits.
Question eight: traders and investors.
Revenue Procedure 92-91 describes the tax
consequences for traders and investors in
SO2 credits. They are generally the same
as for entities that are not traders or
investors, with the exception of deprecia-
tion, involuntary conversion, and penalties,
which do not apply to traders and investors.
The issues affecting traders have been
detailed in the discussion above.
CO2 Credit Concerns 
and Future Regulation
A comparison of CO2 credits with SO2
credits reveals significant similarities and
differences that may affect the tax treat-
ment of CO2 credits. As noted above,
many issues related to CO2 credits should
be reportable in a manner similar to SO2
credits. There, are, however, some
issues for CO2 credits that may not be
easily explained by the SO2 credit guid-
ance. In terms of these differences, there
are several key concerns:
■ Is IRC section 1031 nonrecognition
treatment for like-kind exchanges appli-
cable in the case of CO2 credits?
■ Will there be a provision for record-
ing depreciation in cases involving cred-
its with a definite useful life?
■ What constitutes a “trader” (i.e., fre-
quency of trades, monetary amount of
trades)? Is there a frequency threshold
of trading that affects tax treatment, or
is the treatment entirely based on intent?
■ In the case of credits expiring prior to
their use, is this event treated as an ordi-
nary or capital loss? The guidance for
SO2 credits indicates that they are gen-
erally capital in nature. Currently, CO2
credits are traded but not used by tax-
payers, which should lead to capital treat-
ment. If the United States adopts a cap
and trade system in the future, the
nature of the asset to users of the credits
will not be as clear.
Guidance from the IRS in these
ambiguous areas for users and traders
of  CO2 credi ts  would clar ify the
extent to which the rules of Revenue
Procedure 92-91 may be applied in
these cases. ❑
Maureen Francis Mascha, PhD, is an
assistant professor of accounting at
Marquette University, Milwaukee,
Wis.;  J. William Harden, PhD, is
an associate professor of accounting
at the University of North Carolina at
Greensboro; and James Trebby, PhD,
is an associate professor of account-
ing, also at Marquette University.
Guidance from the IRS for users and
traders of CO2 credits would clarify
the extent to which the rules of
Revenue Procedure 92-91 
may be applied.
